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Preface
International cooperation for development relies on several aid modalities and - in addition 
to bilateral and multilateral programs - non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play an 
important role in channeling development aid towards their Southern partners. The 
support of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to developmental NGOs perceives 
several objectives, ranging from direct poverty alleviation to capacity building and lobby 
and advocacy activities. 
Rigorous evaluations of programs and projects executed by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) are generally scarce and tend to be limited to the analysis of perceived 
effects at local level. Far less attention is usually devoted to the aggregate effect of 
development aid on global civil society strength and performance. This is, however, 
considered of utmost importance given the overarching aim of strengthening the role of 
civil society in the development process.
The recently developed database Indices of Social Development (ISD) hosted by the Institute 
of Social Studies (ISS) of the Erasmus University Rotterdam offers a unique opportunity to 
further analyze the relationships between civil society development and development aid 
(ODA) over a 20-years period, making use of cross-country data of multidimensional 
indicators related to civic activism, intergroup cohesion and club membership. 
The current paper ‘Civil Society, Aid and Development’ has been commissioned by the Policy and 
Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
enable the professional discussions regarding the different pathways for strengthening civil 
society in developing countries. Such analysis requires a careful appraisal of the direction of 
causality and needs to give due attention to endogeneity issues, including several control 
variables to account for other relevant factors.
The study provides an overview of the literature regarding the influence of foreign aid on 
civil society, drawing extensively on theories of social capital, social inclusion and social 
norms. Hereafter, the empirical approach used for the operationalization of civil society 
measurement and development outcomes is outlined. Finally, several estimates for the 
determinants of civil society development strength are specified and used in subsequent 
estimates of their effects on poverty reduction, democratization and human rights. 
The main findings of the study suggest that aid exhibits an ambivalent relation with civil 
society development. Most profound positive effects are registered for civic action and club 
member ship. Also clear interactions with the prevailing rule of law conditions are found, 
pointing at complementarities between formal and informal institutions. Whereas aid 
contributes to poverty alleviation, direct effects of civil society parameters on poverty 
reduction are at best modest. Effects on democratization are difficult to trace. Otherwise, 
quite significant albeit contradictory effects are found for the effects on human rights, with 
a positive sign for intergroup cohesion (bridging social capital) but a negative sign for club 
membership (bonding social capital). 
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Preface
We are grateful to the authors Irene van Staveren and Ellen Webbink for their enduring 
effort to develop the analytical models and to conduct the data analysis that enables us to 
further the discussion on the effectiveness of aid for civil society development. We look 
forward to further discussions regarding the empirical evidence for the development impact 
of NGO aid on civil society performance in developing countries.
Prof. dr. Ruerd Ruben 
Director Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands 
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This study explores the relationships between development aid, civil society and 
development outcomes. It hopes to contribute to the debate on aid effectiveness, in 
particular about the less tangible social dimensions of development. The key asset of this 
study is a rich, innovative database of multidimensional social development indicators, 
hosted by the Institute of Social Studies. The Indices of Social Development database (ISD) 
offers a unique source for development policy research, because it stresses dimensions of 
development that have hitherto been under-valued and/or were often not measured at all. 
The six indices in the database are multidimensional measures for civil society and track 
social development over time for a large number of countries. The indices allow the analysis 
of relationships between aid and civil society on the one hand and between civil society and 
development outcomes on the other hand. Both relationships will be tested in this study, 
for aid receiving countries for the period 1990-2010.
Civil Society and Development:  
a Literature Review
2
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2.1  The emergence of civil society in economic 
development research
The increasing critique on neoliberal development policy and its foundation in mainstream 
economics has resulted around the turn of the century in a more explicit concern with 
social dimensions of development, such as poverty reduction, inequality, and governance 
issues. This has led to the emergence of the Post Washington Consensus in the arena of 
multilateral development aid, in which more attention to social investment and to 
governance issues was added to the original policy set of liberalization, privatization, and 
public expenditure restraint. Structural Adjustment was replaced by Poverty Reduction 
Strategies; the development of the Asian tiger economies was revisited in analyses 
recognizing the role of a strong state in market expansion and accumulation; and 
economists looked for ‘the missing link’ for poverty reduction in other disciplines of the 
social sciences. 
This had led some development economic researchers to enter interdisciplinary 
engagements with sociology, anthropology, and political science, resulting in serious 
attention to two concepts: (1) informal institutions and (2) social capital. Both were 
recognized as lying outside the state and outside the market, although, of course, the 
market is an institution itself. The attention to informal institutions and social capital 
brought a relatively new dimension to development economics, namely attention to a third 
domain next to the market and the state: civil society (see for a conceptual development of 
the third domain in economics, van Staveren, 2001). In a recent paper, Fowler and Biekart 
(2011: 5) characterize the concept of civil society as a “messy empirical category”. They list 
the various understandings of this concept put together by Glasius (2010) as: social capital, 
citizens active in public affairs, non-violent action, fostering public debate and counter 
hegemony. Earlier, Fowler and Biekart (2008) pointed at the dynamic and agency 
dimensions of civil society, which they refer to as civic-driven change. Civic-driven change is 
in their view a combination of three dimensions: civic agency, collective action, and 
empowerment. Hence, they understand civil society as normative, reflecting pro-social 
values and contributing to development. This is similar to the recent view by World Bank 
economist Michael Woolcock (2011) and by political economists Samuel Bowles and Herbert 
Gintis (2002) who also regard civil society as pro-social.
Part of the messy empirical categorization of civil society is the related, and equally 
ambiguous, concept of social cohesion. As Diego Lanzi (2011: 1092) has phrased it recently: 
“the contemporary debate on social cohesion is a fine mess.” The OECD has defined social 
cohesion in its latest annual report. “The current report calls a society ‘cohesive’ if it works 
towards the well-being of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalisation, creates a 
sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward 
social mobility” (OECD, 2012: 53). Woolcock (2011) defines social cohesion in a similar 
normative way as the “capacity of societies (not just groups, networks) to peacefully manage 
collective action problems, in which all are included and treated equally, without 
discrimination”. Easterly et al. (2006: 105), however, have a narrower definition of social 
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cohesion, namely “as the nature and extent of social and economic divisions in society.” 
Finally, Jenson (2010) defines social cohesion in three dimensions: (1) inequality (2) 
institutions and (3) belonging. She argues that “social cohesion is a property of a society … it 
is not an individual characteristic…” (Jenson, 2010: 15). Social cohesion is taking over the 
highly contested concept of social capital. It is being recognized as the substance of civil 
society at the macro level.
In the literature, civil society appears to be an umbrella concept for ‘the third sector’, 
characterized normatively as developing pro-social behaviour and as expressing strong 
social relations and social values. These characteristics have been operationalized in 
development economics research under the broad labels distinguished above: informal 
institutions and social capital, to which social cohesion has been added only recently and 
covering the same variables in empirical research: informal institutions like social and 
cultural norms, religion, and social inequalities on the one hand, and social capital 
variables like trust, networks and associations, on the other hand.
The first of the two civil society concepts, informal institutions, is often simply referred to 
as institutions, not always clearly distinguishing between formal and informal institutions. 
Institutions have generally been defined as the social norms that shape human behaviour. 
The distinction between formal and informal institutions, however, is important, and 
summarized by the World Bank (2011: 8) in its latest World Development Report: “Formal 
institutions are all aspects pertaining to the functioning of the state, including laws, 
regulatory frameworks, and mechanisms for the delivery of services that the state provides”. 
In contrast, “Informal social institutions are the mechanisms, rules, and procedures that 
shape social interactions but do not pertain to the functioning of the state. (…) Social norms 
refer to patterns of behaviour that flow from socially shared beliefs and are enforced by 
informal social sanctions.” Williamson (2009) makes a similar distinction, though limiting 
institutions to constraints on behaviour, as is common in the new institutional economics. 
She clarifies that “formal institutions are defined as political constraints on government 
behaviour enforced by legal institutions. Formal rules encompass constitutional 
constraints, statutory rules, and other political constraints.” In contrast, “informal 
institutions are private constraints stemming from norms, culture, and customs that 
emerge spontaneously. They are not designed or enforced by government” (Williamson, 
2009: 372). What is therefore crucial to the understanding of informal institutions is that 
they are non-state but emerging in social relationships outside government, in what is 
recognized as civil society. 
This distinction has consequences for empirical research. Finding a statistically significant 
impact of informal institutions may not so much be a sign of a strong independent civil 
society, but rather signifying a substitution for weak formal institutions, representing a 
weak state (Beugelsdijk, 2006; Diani, 2004). Studies relying entirely on the generalized trust 
question as a proxy variable for social capital, may therefore yield erroneous conclusions: 
they “do not measure (aspects of ) culture or social capital of which many scholars assume 
they have economic effects, but the well-functioning of institutions” (Beugelsdijk, 2006: 
383.) Bowles and Gintis (2002: F431) also recognize the relationship between state 
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institutions and civil society: “The face-to-face local interactions of community are thus not 
a substitute for effective government but rather a complement.” Another critique on the 
empirical research is that the institutional approach to integrating civil society in 
development economics has until recently largely ignored the role of asymmetric 
institutions, that is, institutions that have different effects on different groups in society, 
often advantaging one group over another as is the case with gendered institutions 
(Odebode, van Staveren, 2007). A major step forward has been the work by the OECD on 
gendered institutions, showing how these limit women’s access to resources (Morrisson 
and Jütting, 2005) and constrain their agency (van Staveren, forthcoming).
The research on informal institutions in development economics began to integrate 
property rights, governance, democracy, entrepreneurship, productivity, and political and 
social stability in growth analyses (Rodrik, 2003; and for a critical discussion, see Durlauf et 
al., 2008). Mostly, the institutional variables included in the analyses refer to state 
institutions that would facilitate free markets, such as the Rule of Law or time to get 
through a bureaucracy when setting up a business, or expropriation risk. Chang (2011) is 
quite sceptical of this literature, and argues that strong formal institutions that protect 
property rights are not a necessary condition for growth, which is for example shown by the 
case of China. The research on informal institutions focused in the beginning on religion 
and its behavioural norms that are thought to be supportive of markets (Barro and 
McCleary, 2003). This focus derived from Max Weber’s thesis of the protestant work ethic 
(Weber, 1992) and was later empirically tested and qualified (Norris and Inglehart, 2009). 
More recently, development research recognizes a relationship between formal and 
informal institutions. A special issue of World Development on institutions concludes, that 
“the papers illustrate in a number of different contexts how informal institutions influence 
the nature and quality of more formal institutions, and how the two together are likely to 
influence the process of development” (Casson et al., 2010: 140). This insight has informed 
our empirical analysis by including variables for both formal and informal institutions.
The second of the civil society concepts referred to above is social capital. It was applauded 
by the World Bank Social Capital Project as ‘the missing link’ in economic development 
research (see for a reflection on the project six years later: Bebbington et al., 2004). In this 
project, social capital was defined as “the institutions, the relationships, the attitudes and 
values that govern interactions among people and contribute to economic and social 
development” (World Bank, 1998: 1). It explicitly includes the notion of institutions and was 
regarded as the link between the determinants of economic growth on the one hand and 
desirable development outcomes such as poverty reduction, health improvements, or 
reductions in inequality on the other hand (see, for example, Isham et al., 2002). Hayami 
(2009: 98) defines social capital “as the structure of informal social relationships conducive 
to developing cooperation among economic actors aimed at increasing social product, 
which is expected to accrue to the group of people embedded in those relationships.” 
Bowles and Gintis (2002: F419) provide a more micro-level definition, deriving from their 
extensive research in experimental economics. “Social capital generally refers to trust, 
concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live by the norms of one’s community and to 
punish those who do not.” 
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The embracement of the concept of social capital by development economists resulted in 
empirical research in which social capital was integrated as a proxy variable both for 
analytical purposes as well as for defining possible policy variables (Dasgupta and Serageldin, 
1999; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002). Most of this literature 
measures social capital subjectively through the generalized trust question from the World 
Value Surveys (‘do you, in general, trust other people?’) or in micro research, the number and 
extent of networks or the extent of associational membership by a target group, such as 
micro-borrowers, medium scale entrepreneurs, or farmers. The integration of social capital 
as a way to capture civil society has, contrary to its use in sociology by Bourdieu and others, 
entered economics in a largely instrumentalist way, namely, as market-friendly potential, 
reducing the need for public policy and social spending. 
It has been criticized because of this and because of its individualist understanding of civil 
society with limited attention to inequality (Fine, 1999 and 2001; Baron et al., 2000; van 
Staveren, 2003). Bowles and Gintis (2002: F419-420) have formulated the two positions on 
social capital sharply: “Those to the left of center are attracted to the social capital idea 
because it affirms the importance of trust, generosity and collective action in social 
problem solving, thus countering the idea that well-defined property rights and competitive 
markets could so successfully harness selfish motives to public ends as to make civic virtue 
unnecessary. Proponents of laissez faire are enchanted because it holds the promise that 
where markets fail – in the provision of local public goods and many types of insurance for 
example – neighbourhoods, parent teacher associations, bowling leagues, indeed anything 
but the government, could step in to do the job.” These two very different interpretations of 
social capital are allowed by the widespread use of a singular, subjective proxy variable, 
namely ‘trust’. But trust may actually be more an outcome than a determinant of social 
capital, as Field has argued, and more so within certain groups than across groups (2003, 
pp. 65 and 125). Moreover, various micro development economists caution against the use 
of simple social capital proxies in complex analyses, because that tends to ignore various 
positive and negative externalities (van Staveren, 2000; van Staveren and Knorringa, 2007; 
Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). The sociological and political science literature has revealed 
the complexities of social capital, entailing a variety of social values and cultural meanings, 
as well as a strong role of power, conflict and inequality. In particular, horizontal 
inequalities – inequalities between groups – matter, as Stewart (2009) has explained. A 
rather limited and individualistic approach to measuring social capital in economic 
analyses becomes even more worrying when social capital is regarded as a policy variable. 
This can easily lead to a position in which poverty is regarded as having a simple cure 
without any support from the state, simply by the poor themselves through their social 
bonding, trust, and solidarity. This implicit message has met with strong critique, among 
others from John Harriss and Paolo de Renzio (1997), Ben Fine (2001) and Frances Cleaver 
(2005). Moreover, meso-level research, with a disaggregated approach to measuring social 
capital and its economic effects, has pointed out that social capital is created at the 
meso-level. In line with this recognition, the distinction between bonding and bridging 
social capital has been increasingly understood as a crucial differentiation, whereby 
bonding social capital is limited to the micro level in homogeneous groups, whereas 
bridging social capital occurs at the meso-level, and sometimes even extends to the  
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macro level (f.e. through trade, migration, and social activism). It is only the second type of 
social capital which leads to social cohesion.
The two approaches towards integrating civil society in development economic research – 
as informal institutions and as social capital – have come together over the past ten years. 
This has happened probably because researchers realized that the basis for both informal 
institutions and social capital is shared social norms and values in a society, either pro-
social and leading to social cohesion, or serving particular interest groups and leading to 
inequalities, exclusion, and tensions. This is the case, for example, in studies analysing the 
causes of slow growth in Africa (Collier and Gunning, 1999); the effects of ethnic group 
norms and cooperation on trade success (van Staveren and Knorringa, 2007); the effect of 
ethnic fragmentation on growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Okediji, 2011); or the impacts of 
institutions on both inequality and growth (Davis and Hopkins, 2011). 
The strength of integrating civil society through informal institutions and social capital 
variables is that indeed a missing link was found: the variables often, though not 
consistently, show statistically significant results with development outcomes. Some studies 
became quite influential, such as the volumes put together by Dasgupta and Serageldin 
(1999) and Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2002) on social capital and development; an 
influential article by Knack and Keefer (1997), followed up by Knack and Zak (2001) on the 
impact of trust on growth; and the work on formal institutions of development by La Porta 
et al. (1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). An exception to the narrow focus on GDP in these 
studies is a case study on Bangladesh on the effect of development aid to civil society and its 
positive impact on development outcomes in terms of poverty, equality, and democratization 
(Kabeer, Kabir, Huq, 2009). Moreover, the measurement of informal institutions is often 
narrow, relying on just one social or cultural norm as a proxy variable, which does not do 
justice to the broad understanding of informal institutions and their constitution of civil 
society. José Antonio Alonso (2011) has therefore rightly argued that institutions play a role 
only together with other factors, in which history matters importantly. 
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2.2  Measurement of civil society and  
empirical results
The literature on civil society and development does not explicitly measure poverty but uses 
GDP per capita levels or GDP growth as outcome variables. The implicit assumption is that 
growth will trickle down to poverty reduction, in particular when it is inclusive growth, 
presumably associated with a stronger civil society. Some studies include a measure of 
inequality among its independent variables, which is an important dimension of civil 
society, as we have discussed above. Unfortunately, the vast majority of growth regressions 
taking institutions into account only include formal institutions, often those related to the 
protection of property rights. Social capital is often measured only with the general trust 
question from the World Values Surveys. Empirical results, nevertheless, all point in the 
same direction: stronger formal institutions, less inequality and stronger informal 
institutions and social capital are associated with higher levels of GDP per capita and higher 
economic growth. Most studies acknowledge that there may be a problem of endogeneity. 
Some address this by using time lags while others use instrumental variable analysis, such 
as two-stage least squares, others do not address the issue at all. When instruments are used 
to address endogeneity, studies only use instruments for formal institutions, often 
historical measures of state formation or early European settler mortality rates. These 
instruments, however, are not suitable for informal institutions and social capital variables 
because instruments for these civil society measures should reflect intangible, social 
dimensions of development for which no historical data seems to be available. Therefore, 
unfortunately, it is not possible to use two stage least squares or other instrumental variable 
analyses for this study. In our methodology section, however, we do come up with a simpler 
technique that does at least address the issue to some extent, although we acknowledge 
that this is imperfect. We do hope that suitable instrumental variables will be developed in 
the near future by data collection on historical values of social development, cultural 
norms, and other relevant informal institutions.
Davis and Hopkins (2011: 995) conclude that “institutional reforms that increase the security 
of property rights for the poor, or the quality of property rights enforcement more generally, 
will tend to increase economic growth while simultaneously reducing income inequality.” 
In a comparison of the effect of geography, trade and formal institutions, Rodrik et al. 
(2004) find that the effect of institutions is much larger than that of the other two 
explanatory variables, which even have the wrong sign in a multivariate estimation. But 
they admit that the policy implication of their finding is “extremely meagre” (p. 157), 
because they measure institutions only through the formal institutional variable Rule of 
Law, which is a subjective measure consisting of experts’ ratings of the quality of property 
rights protection in a country. Easterly et al. (2006) do include measures of civil society and 
try eleven different measures for formal institutions, including Rule of Law. They conclude 
that “more social cohesion leads to better institutions, and that better institutions in turn 
lead to higher growth. This is true regardless of how we measure institutions” (p. 113). In 
one of the very few studies comparing formal and informal institutions, Williamson (2009: 
377) finds that “countries that have stronger informal institutions, regardless of the strength 
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of formal institutions, achieve higher levels of economic development than those countries 
with lower informal institutional scores.” This finding supports Chang’s (2011) scepticism 
about the primacy of formal institutions.
The other development outcome variable in our study is democracy. The development 
literature distinguishes between different types of democracy (OECD 2012). One such 
distinction uses an increasing role of civic agency: representative democracy, participatory 
democracy, and developmental democracy (Boyte, 2008: 121). It is probably this diversity 
which helps to explain the ambiguous empirical results found in the literature in regression 
analyses with civil society variables on the one hand and democracy variables on the other 
hand, and of regressions of ODA on democratization (Charron, 2011; Knack 2001). In this 
literature, democracy is often measured by the Polity 2 variable of the Polity IV Project, 
which measures the quality of democracies. Qualitative studies seem to be better able to 
capture the various relationships between civil society and democracy. A study by Robinson 
and Friedman (2005) provides three case studies, on Ghana, South Africa and Uganda. “The 
studies demonstrate that … the contribution of civil society organisations to democracy 
extends to their ability to foster participation and deliberation, to build leadership capacity, 
and to nurture values of tolerance and consensus building, all of which are a function of 
internal democratic practices. Its capacity to offer citizens a say in decisions and to enhance 
pluralism may be as important as the ability to influence decision-making and demand 
accountability from state actors” (Robinson and Friedman, 2005: 40). 
Apart from the limited measurement of civil society through the general trust question, 
there is another problem, which concerns the measurement of the inequality and cohesion 
dimensions of civil society. The most frequently used measures are ethnic and linguistic 
diversity, assuming that with more diversity there is more inequality and less cohesion, and 
hence, a weaker civil society (see, for example, Jenson, 2010). The problem with this 
measure is that it confuses diversity with conflict: countries with high ethnic, religious, or 
linguistic diversity may have much less tensions between groups than countries that have 
only two or three major groups – such as blacks, coloured and whites in the Apartheid era or 
Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda. Recognizing this trap, the recent OECD report on social 
development therefore states that “group polarization, rather than inequality itself” should 
be regarded “as the principal explanation for inter-group inequalities eventually leading to 
conflict” (OECD, 2012: 106). 
 
Theoretical framework for the 
cross-country analysis in this study
3
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What we learn from the empirical studies is that (1) estimations with informal institutions 
need to be complemented by a formal institutional control variable, for which it does not 
matter much which one is chosen (2) civil society cannot be captured by a single variable 
but requires multidimensional measurement for capturing the complexity of the 
phenomenon (3) horizontal inequalities, rather than diversity, needs to be taken into 
account to capture the dark side of social capital (exclusion, discrimination, conflict 
between groups) (4) possible endogeneity problems need to be addressed, even when 
instruments for civil society variables are unavailable.
We propose the following loosely defined theoretical framework for the cross-country 
empirical analysis in this report. First, we understand civil society as a complex set of 
informal institutions and social capital with three interrelated dimensions: social bonds, 
horizontal inequalities, and transformative agency. We will use therefore multidimensional 
measurement of civil society with composite indices. Second, we see civil society as 
contributing to development outcomes and in mutual reinforcement with formal 
institutions. Civil society and formal institutions will often complement each other, rather 
than being substitutes, whereby we expect that informal institutions are the most 
foundational ones, on which formal institutions may be built, supported, challenged, and 
adapted. But a stronger civil society may lead to short run set-backs in development 
outcomes, or may only deliver when also formal institutions change, as the recent Arab 
Spring developments indicate. Third, we expect that development aid will positively 
contribute to civil society, under certain conditions. Due to the heterogeneity of civil 
society, support to some civil society organizations and networks may have a stronger effect 
than support to others, while in some instances, donor aid to civil society organizations 
may even undermine the indigenous dynamics of civic driven change and re-enforce 
inequalities.
These three elements form our loosely defined theoretical framework, reflecting recent 
developments in the literature from social capital to social cohesion and from a focus on 
formal to attention to informal institutions. Our unique contribution to this emerging 
theoretical framework is to use multidimensional measures of civil society in which we 
account for all key dimensions emerging from the recent literature: social bonds, horizontal 
inequalities, and transformative agency. On the basis of this theoretical framework we 
hypothesize that for a large sample of developing countries over the period 1990-2010, 
development aid will have a positive effect on civil society, and that a stronger civil society 
will positively contribute to poverty reduction and to democratization.
Methodology: measuring civil 
society and development 
outcomes
4
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4.1  Civil Society variables
The database Indices of Social Development (ISD), launched in 2011 by the Institute of Social 
Studies, is the first database that presents a set of coherent, broad based indices of civil 
society for a large number of countries. It is broad because it includes around 200 variables 
covering all the relevant dimensions of civil society developed in our theoretical framework 
of civil society in development. The data are available for five years, with five years in 
between, calculated as averages around each of these years (1990-2010). 
Emerging research with the ISD points at a wide variety of applications. The ISD Working 
Paper Series and the research conference in December 2011 provide an overview of studies 
that make use of the database. First, the studies suggest that the indices, such as the Gender 
Equality Index, are indeed broad-based as compared to comparable indices like the Gender 
Inequality Index published in UNDP’s Human Development Report (van Staveren, 2011). 
Second, they confirm that the indices reflect informal institutions, social cohesion, and 
inequalities, so they are indeed broad-based (Dulal and Foa, 2011). Third, the statistical tests 
that have been carried out in developing the six indices have shown that they are quite 
distinct. There is no overlap in the underlying indicators but they are complementary. They 
are positively correlated to each other, except for Clubs and Associations, which shows 
negative correlations with most of the other indices (Foa and Tanner, 2011)1. Fourth, in a 
multivariate regression analysis for aid effectiveness, Foa (2011) found that Intergroup 
Cohesion has a statistically significant negative effect on the percentage of donor aid 
channelled through a receiving country’s public financial management system. Apparently, 
a stronger civil society in this respect does not parallel stronger governance in the receipt  
of donor aid.
This study will use three indices from the ISD database, as measures of civil society suitable 
for testing the hypotheses formulated above: Civic Activism, Intergroup Cohesion, and 
Clubs and Associations. Annex 3 gives an overview of the countries with the largest positive 
and negative changes in each of these indices between 2000 and 2010.
1.  Civic Activism (34 indicators) covering the transformative agency dimension of civil society:
 Civic activism refers to the social norms, organizations, and practices, which facilitate 
citizen involvement in public policies and decisions. The index consists of data on, for 
example, access to the media, participation in demonstrations and petitions, the density 
of international organizations, and the CIVICUS civil society rating.
2.  Intergroup Cohesion (27 indicators) covering the macro level of horizontal inequalities 
and social cohesion in civil society:
 Intergroup cohesion concerns the relations of cooperation and respect between 
predominant identity groups in a society. This index includes data on, for example, the 
incidence of riots and terrorist acts, tension between ethnic or religious groups, 
1 Clubs and Associations correlates negatively with Intergroup Cohesion and positively with Civil Activism.
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 discrimination of particular groups and the extent to which people reject particular 
others as neighbours2.
3.  Clubs and Associations (36 indicators) covering the micro level of horizontal inequalities 
and bonding in civil society:
 Clubs and Associations refers to bonding ties in communities. Where these ties are 
strong, individuals are better able to weather the impact of sudden hardship, by relying 
on the support of their friends, neighbours, and locality. The index consists of data on, 
for example, membership of community groups, trade unions, development 
organizations, time spent on unpaid voluntary health work, and view on whether 
neighbours tend to help each other.
4.2 Development aid and outcome data
First, we will estimate the relationship between Official Development Aid (ODA) on the one 
hand and civil society on the other hand. For this analysis, we use aggregate ODA data for 
receiving developing countries, from the OECD (DCD-DAC) database for ODA3. The data is in 
million US dollar at current prices. We take five-year averages in order to parallel the ISD 
five-year period data. The OECD database does not contain disaggregated ODA data for 
funds flowing to civil society, by receiving country for the period 1990-2005. This, however, 
is not fatal, since it is expected that a non-negligible share of ODA will support civil society 
indirectly, even though direct ODA to civil society related objectives is estimated to be only 
2%, according to OECD (2012: 247).
Second, we will estimate the relationship between civil society and development outcomes. 
For this relationship, we have tried a variety of indicators in order to capture poverty 
reduction and democratization. Unfortunately, the literature did not provide any guidance 
on the selection of variables. This is because, as stated above, quantitative studies of civil 
society effects on development are limited to GDP. The preferred variables for poverty 
reduction are the recently developed Human Poverty Index or MDG tracking measures, but 
for these there is insufficient data available for the time period under study. We have 
therefore selected the widely used poverty headcount of 1.25 dollar a day to measure poverty 
incidence. For democratization we have selected the Polity-2 variable (‘revised democracy 
score’) from the Polity IV project, following the literature (Davis and Hopkins, 2011). This 
variable represents only one characterization of democracy as mentioned above, namely 
representative democracy. Polity-2 is measured on a 21-point scale from fully 
institutionalized autocracies to fully institutionalized democracies. We selected in addition 
to this variable also a proxy variable for developmental democracy, namely a human rights 
2 In March 2012, a sixth index has been added to the ISD database, which uses some of the original 
indicators, including the one on neighbours from the Intergoup Cohesion index. 
3 We define ODA as “Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are concessional in 
character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent rate of discount)… ODA 
receipts comprise disbursements by bilateral donors and multilateral institutions” (OECD, 2003).
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variable. We use the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, which is an additive index 
constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and 
Disappearance indicators4. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights)  
to 8 (full government respect for these four rights). 
For control variables, we use controls that are widely used in growth regressions. We use 
GDP per capita in constant 2000 US dollars for 30 years earlier in order to control for initial 
level of development, the primary school enrolment rate for 25 years earlier in order to 
control for human capital, which we multiply by a factor 100 in order to make the parameter 
values more visible  (following Henderson et. al, 2011), and Rule of Law representing formal 
institutions, which is a widely used variable in the literature reviewed above (following 
Beugelsdijk, 2006; Henderson et. al, 2011; Rodrik et al., 2004; Easterly et al., 2006; Knack, 
2001). Rule of Law is taken from the World Governance Indicators and is measured on a 
scale between -2.5 and +2.5 in our data, hence a 5 points scale (see Table 1).
The table below shows that the three ISD variables, listed as the first three, all range 
between 0 and 1, but remaining within these outer limits. The mean values are around 0.5 
and standard deviations around 0.1. So, they are not standardized normal distributions, but 
standardized to a scale between 0 and 1. This is so, because the values for each index 
represent country rankings, for approx. 150-180 countries.
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Civic Activism 618 0.459 0.069 0.110 0.763
Intergroup Cohesion 436 0.569 0.094 0.080 0.770
Clubs and Associations 260 0.503 0.111 0.155 0.876
% People living under 
1.25$ a day 364 9.875 12.23 0 63.34
Human Rights 641 4.343 2.090 0 8
Democracy 555 1.339 6.417 -10 10
Log ODA 741 4.863 1.736 -4.605 8.876
Primary Gross  
Enrollment Rate 454 86.39 34.85 7.005 214.6
Rule of Law 551 -0.482 0.698 -2.53 1.710
Log GDP 1041 6.906 1.117 4.291 9.332
4 For details on the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index, see Cingranelli and Richards (1999).
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4.3 Estimation method
Because of the availability of data for all variables both at the cross-country level and for the 
twenty-year period 1990-2010, we have constructed panel data. It is an unbalanced panel, 
because for some years, there is no data available for every country. Following the literature 
on panel data analysis with country-year data, we use the unbalanced, larger set of data. 
This does not affect the reliability of our results, while reducing the panel to a balanced 
panel would seriously reduce the sample size. With this panel we tested our hypotheses 
employing multivariate GLS random-effects panel data analysis with regional dummies. We 
opted for a GLS random effects model because the Breusch-Pagan test has indicated that 
OLS estimations would suffer from heteroskedasticity. We used random-effects estimations 
because of few years of observations per country (3 or 4).The Hausman test indicated that 
for most estimations fixed effects were indeed not suitable. The tables report R square 
values within countries, between countries and overall. 
There are other possible endogeneity problems that need to be addressed, as the theoretical 
framework already indicates: it is possible that poverty or democracy influence the strength 
of civil society and that these indicators, as well as civil society, have an effect on the level of 
ODA that a country receives. The way in which we measure civil society, however, makes it 
not very likely that the development outcome variables will have a feedback effect on our 
civil society measures. That is because we measure civil society with indices that consist of 
over twenty five individual indicators, subjective and objective, slow changing ones and 
quicker changing ones. It is not likely that such  indices will be affected through feedback 
loups that affect the majority of the underlying indicators in a substantial way5. But it may 
be the case that the strength of civil society influences levels of ODA. We will address the 
possible endogeneity effects in the methodological section.
We therefore tested the possible remaining endogeneity in our estimations by relying on 
Granger-inspired causality tests of the ISD variables and several development outcome 
variables, carried out by Huang and Cameron (2012). This is a test for time-related causality, 
assessing statistically whether a change in variable Z occurs later in time than a change in 
variable Y as well as a previous value of variable Z, and with which probability. The 
development outcome variables tested in that study are GDP per capita, the Human 
Development Index (HDI), and the Gini coefficient for income inequality. The results for the 
three ISD indices that we use in our study are as follows. For GDP per capita, Clubs and 
Associations shows statistically significant causal flows to GDP per capita (p<0.05). 
Intergroup cohesion shows no causal flow in either direction, and Civic Activism shows a 
5 Nevertheless, we did try instrumental variable analysis in order to prevent any possible endogeneity in 
our estimations. We instrumented ODA with colonial origin of countries as was done by Charron (2011) 
and we instrumented our civil society indices with dummies for religion as in Foa (2011). The Sargan-
Hansen test however, indicated that these are not adequate instruments for our estimation. The reason 
for this is probably, as was indicated in the literature review, that such instruments are generally used 
for formal institutions and not for informal institutions. Informal institutions are probably too difficult 
to capture with an instrument, because they are intangible, and in our study, measured in a 
multidimensional way.
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reverse causal flow (p<0.1), namely from GDP per capita to Civic Activism. The results for the 
estimations with the Civic Activism variable therefore need to be interpreted with caution. 
For the HDI, Civic Activism shows statistically significant causal flows to HDI (p<0.01). There 
is no Granger causality established between HDI and Clubs and Associations and Intergroup 
Cohesion. Finally, the results for the Gini coefficient indicate no Granger causality with 
Intergroup Cohesion. The test for Civic Activism and Clubs and Associations show statistically 
significant Granger causality to the Gini coefficient with respectively (p<0.01) and (p<0.1). 
The results from the Granger-inspired causality tests, hence, do not raise serious concerns 
for endogeneity effects for our civil society variables. There was only one reverse causality 
established, of Civic Activism with GDP per capita, but this was not the case for the same 
variable with the HDI and with the Gini coefficient, where the expected causal relationship 
from Civic Activism to human development and to income inequality was confirmed. 
We did Granger-inspired causality tests for the relationships between ODA and our civil 
society indices for four years and these show more mixed results. ODA has a statistically 
significant (negative) effect on Civic Activism in one year, but not for the other three years. 
For two years, there is a statistically significant reverse (negative) effect. ODA has a 
statistically significant (negative) effect on Intergoup Cohesion in one year, but not for the 
other three years. For one year, there is a statistically significant reverse (negative) effect. 
Finally, ODA has a statistically significant (positive) effect on Clubs and Associations in two 
of the four years, while for one year there is a statistically significant reverse (positive) effect. 
These results indicate that there may be serious endogeneity effects in the estimation of the 
effect of ODA on civil society. We therefore present the results for the first set of models with 
much caution.
We addressed possible nonlinearities by using the variables that are expressed in money 
terms in logarithmic form. We did this for ODA and for initial GDP per capita. Finally, we 
carried out several robustness tests for our estimations. For primary schooling, we 
substituted this for secondary schooling which gave similar results. Rule of Law was already 
tested for its robustness in the literature reviewed above (see, in particular, Easterly at al., 
2006). Finally, we used two outcome variables for democracy, and report results for both, 
because they seem to complement each other rather than showing similar results for all 
three civil society indices.
Annex 3 provides scatter plots for all dependent variables with the key independent variables.
 
Empirical Results
5
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This section will provide the empirical results in three groups of models, presented in three 
tables. The first set of models concerns poverty, the second set is about democratization and 
the last set concerns human rights models. Each table shows the model results for each of the 
three civil society indices: Civic Activism, Intergroup Cohesion, and Clubs and Associations.
 
Table 2 Determinants of Civil Society, random effects
Civic Activism Intergroup 
Cohesion
Clubs and 
Associations
ODA (Log) 0.007*** -0.022*** 0.014*
(0.002) (0.006) (0.008)
Primary  School Enrollment  
(*100)  (25 years prior)
0.044***
0.032
0.054 *
(0.009) (0.023) (0.028)
Rule of Law 0.020*** 0.078*** 0.001
(0.005) (0.012) (0.019)
Initial GDP 
(30 years prior)
0.017*** -0.028*** -0.036**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.016)
South America 0.011 -0.002 -0.046
(0.013) (0.027) (0.053)
Africa -0.021* -0.019 -0.073
(0.012) (0.026) (0.055)
Europe -0.008 -0.001 -0.162**
(0.018) (0.035) (0.066)
Asia -0.025* -0.047* -0.099*
(0.013) (0.026) (0.057)
Oceania -0.054*** -0.032
(0.017) (0.052)
Constant 0.310*** 0.924*** 0.695***
(0.037) (0.085) (0.134)
Observations 405 314 204
Number of id 112 98 63
R Squared (within) 0.1669 0.1093   0.0159     
R Squared (between) 0.5400  0.2964  0.2398      
R Squared (overall) 0.4414  0.2498   0.2471         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2 shows the regression results for the civil society models. The results indicate 
statistically significant correlations between ODA and the strength of civil society. Due to 
the mixed results of the Granger-inspired causality tests, we cannot interpret these 
uncritically as uni-directional causal relationships. The model fit is quite good for a panel 
data model, with overall explanation of the variation in the dependent variable ranging 
between 25 percent and 44 percent for the three models, while the explained variation 
between countries is on average higher, as we would expect and indeed test with a random 
effects model (ranging between 24 percent and 54 percent). The regional dummies in all 
tables are relative to Mexico and the Caribbean (Northern Latin America). 
For the first model, with Civic Activism as the dependent variable, we find that a ten percent 
increase in the amount of ODA received is associated with a statistically significant 0.07 
points increase in the score for Civic Activism (which runs from 0.00 to 1.00), a moderate 
effect. A one unit increase on the formal institutional variable, Rule of Law, is associated 
with a statistically significant 0.02 point increase in Civic Activism. This implies that going 
up one fifth of the five-point scale for Rule of Law is associated with an increase of more 
than two-thirds of the standard deviation in the Civic Activism score. The dummy variables 
indicate three statistically significant results, which all have relatively large size effects. For 
African countries, Civic Activism is 0.02 points lower, for Asia it is 0.03 lower, and for 
Oceania it is 0.05 points lower as compared to Northern Latin America. If we assume a 
causal relationship between ODA and Civic Activism, this implies that for Africa and Asia, 
roughly a 13-14 percent increase in ODA for these countries would have the same effect on 
Civic Activism as a ten percent ODA increase for countries in the Caribbean. Of the two 
control variables for initial conditions, primary schooling has a small association (0.04), 
which is statistically significant. GDP per capita indicates that if initial GDP per capita (30 
years earlier) would have been ten percent larger, Civic Activism would be 0.17 points 
higher, which is a two and a half times bigger effect as compared to the effect of ODA.
The second model, with Intergroup Cohesion as dependent variable, finds a negative sign 
for development aid. It shows that a ten percent increase in the amount of ODA is 
associated with a statistically significant 0.22 points decrease in the score for Intergroup 
Cohesion. This is considerably large, namely three times the standard deviation of 
Intergroup Cohesion. The association of Rule of Law is positive and statistically significant. 
Again, it is a rather large effect: a one point increase in Rule of Law is associated with 0.08 
point on the Intergroup Cohesion scale - almost one standard deviation increase in 
Intergroup Cohesion. The dummy variables for geography show only one statistically 
significant coefficient, negative, for Asia (-0.05). The control variable for education is 0.03 
and not statistically significant. For initial GDP per capita, the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant (-0.03). 
In the third model, with Clubs and Associations as dependent variable, we find that a ten 
percent increase in the amount of ODA received is associated with a statistically significant 
0.14 points increase in the score for Clubs and Associations. This is again a relatively large 
effect, namely more than one standard deviation in the score for Clubs and Associations. 
Rule of Law has a coefficient of zero, which is not statistically significant. The regional 
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dummies show negative statistically significant effects for Europe (0.16 points lower) and 
Asia (0.10 points lower). This implies that, if we assume causality between ODA and Clubs 
and Associations, European ODA receiving countries need to receive twice as much ODA 
(hence, not ten but twenty percent increase) as Caribbean countries in order to see the same 
increase in Clubs and Associations. Asian countries would need to receive an additional 
seven percent of ODA to generate the same increase. Education has a small coefficient 
(0.05), although it is statistically significant. The coefficient for initial GDP per capita is 
statistically significant and negative (-0.036). The implication is that if initial income would 
have been ten percent higher, Clubs and Associations would have been 0.36 points lower, 
which is a third on the entire scale.
The conclusion from the first set of estimations is that if we can assume causality from ODA 
to civil society, there is a relatively large effect of ODA on civil society, positive for Civic 
Activism and Clubs and Associations, but negative for Intergroup Cohesion. We also see a 
large effect of formal institutions measured by Rule of Law, and a small effect of the initial 
primary schooling rate. The effect of initial GDP per capita is ambiguous while there are 
considerable negative regional effects, in particular for Asia.
 
Table 3 Determinants of Poverty, random effects
Civic Activism Intergroup 
Cohesion
Clubs and 
Associations
Civic Activism -42.17***
(11.290)
Intergroup Cohesion -1.171
(5.104)
Clubs and Associations -5.872
(5.240)
ODA (Log) -1.257** -1.324** -1.090**
(0.563) (0.592) (0.523)
Primary School Enrollment  
(*100) (25 years prior)
-1.260 -3.480 -4.370
(2.160) (2.720) (2.960)
Rule of Law 0.19 -0.417 0.144
(1.386) (1.455) (1.468)
Initial GDP (30 years prior) -7.004*** -7.422*** -7.403***
(1.113) (1.136) (1.181)
South America -0.0773 0.168 0.369
(3.238) (3.269) (3.697)
Africa 1.245 3.369 2.475
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Table 3 Determinants of Poverty, random effects
Civic Activism Intergroup 
Cohesion
Clubs and 
Associations
(3.203) (3.533) (3.965)
Europe -6.595 -5.352 -7.721*
(4.061) (4.014) (4.630)
Asia -6.302* -4.596 -4.942
(3.240) (3.395) (4.037)
Oceania -0.641 -0.871
(6.659) (8.240)
Constant 88.320*** 72.310*** 74.850***
(9.832) (10.910) (10.740)
Observations 219 186 142
Number of id 92 80 57
R Squared (within) 0.3097 0.2308 0.3372
R Squared (between) 0.6116 0.6558 0.5599
R Squared (overall) 0.6091 0.6217 0.5886
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3 shows the regression results for the three poverty models, one for each civil society 
index, with the proportion of people living under 1.25 dollar a day as dependent variable. All 
signs are as expected, namely, more civil society, ODA, or initial income lead to lower levels 
of poverty.
The first model shows a statistically significant negative effect of Civic Activism on the 
extent of poverty. When Civic Activism increases 0.10 points, the poverty ratio goes down by 
4.2 percentage points – a moderate effect. Development aid also has, as expected, a 
statistically significant negative effect on poverty. A ten percent increase in ODA leads to a 
decline of poverty by 12.6 percentage points, which is substantial. Rule of Law and initial 
primary school enrolment have no statistically significant effects. Initial GDP per capita has 
a large statistically significant negative effect. If initial GDP per capita would have been ten 
percent higher, than the proportion of people living in poverty would have been 70 
percentage points lower. The regional dummy points out that countries in Asia have a 6.3 
percent lower poverty ratio than those in the Caribbean.
The second model shows no statistically significant effect of Intergroup Cohesion on 
poverty, and the size effect is negligible. ODA has a statistically significant negative effect on 
poverty, which is similar to the previous model. A ten percent increase in ODA results in a 
decline of the poverty rate by 13.2 percentage points. Education and Rule of Law have again 
no statistically significant effect on poverty. Initial GDP per capita has a large statistically 
significant negative effect. If initial GDP per capita would have been ten percent higher, 
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than the poverty headcount ratio would have been 74 percentage points lower. There are no 
statistically significant geographical effects.
The third model shows no statistically significant effect of Clubs and Associations on 
poverty, and the size effect is negligible. Development aid has a statistically significant 
negative effect on poverty, which is slightly smaller than that of the previous two models. A 
ten percent increase in ODA results in a decline of the poverty rate by 11 percentage points. 
The regional dummy indicates that countries in Europe have a 7.7 percent lower poverty 
ratio than those in the Caribbean.
The conclusion from the poverty models is that civil society has only a statistically 
significant effect on poverty through Civic Activism. ODA has a substantial positive and 
statistically significant effect on poverty reduction. Formal institutions, measured through 
the Rule of Law, have no statistically significant effect and initial primary education also has 
not. Initial income has a moderate to large effect on poverty, and there are very few 
geographical effects.
Table 4 shows the results for the relationships between civil society and democracy. It is 
important to remember that this variable ranges between -10 and +10 (see Table 1), so 
changes should be taken relative to a 21-point scale.
The first model shows no statistically significant effect of Civic Activism on democracy, and 
the size effect is negligible. For ODA we find a positive statistically significant effect that is 
substantial. A ten percent increase in ODA implies an increase in democracy of 7.9 points, 
which is more than one standard deviation on the scale of the democracy variable. Rule of 
Law shows, as expected, a positive and statistically significant effect on democracy. A one 
point increase in Rule of Law (a fifth on the 5-point scale) results in a 2.5 points increase in 
democracy, which is more than 10% on the democracy scale, which seems a moderate effect. 
Initial GDP has no statistically significant effect but initial education has. For a 10 points 
increase in the initial primary enrolment rate, democracy improves by 0.3 points, which is a 
small effect. The regional dummies indicate that the level of democracy is 7.2 points lower 
in Africa and 8.8 points lower in Asia.
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Table 4 Determinants of Democracy, random effects
Civic Activism Intergroup 
Cohesion
Clubs and 
Associations
Civic Activism 1.666
(5.210)
Intergroup Cohesion -9.539***
(2.542)
Clubs and Associations 4.763
(3.128)
ODA (Log) 0.793*** 0.516* 0.113
(0.257) (0.286) (0.334)
Primary School Enrollment 
(*100) (25 years prior)
3.070*** 3.590*** 2.700**
(1.090) (1.310) (1.260)
Rule of Law 2.503*** 3.564*** 1.654*
(0.639) (0.765) (0.852)
Initial GDP (30 years prior) -0.718 -1.197** -0.524
(0.525) (0.591) (0.688)
South America -1.936 -1.887 -0.321
(2.008) (1.979) (2.172)
Africa -7.202*** -7.619*** -6.016***
(1.868) (1.920) (2.302)
Europe -4.526* -4.715* -0.332
(2.691) (2.650) (2.918)
Asia -8.759*** -9.628*** -6.844***
(1.923) (1.907) (2.356)
Oceania -2.772 -5.153
(3.142) (3.665)
Constant 7.024 18.670*** 6.958
(4.862) (5.729) (6.260)
Observations 374 303 198
Number of id 102 95 61
R Squared (within) 0.0754 0.1200 0.0295
R Squared (between) 0.3232 0.3355 0.3485
R Squared (overall) 0.3115 0.3350 0.3425
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The second model shows a statistically significant but negative effect of Intergroup 
Cohesion on democracy. A 0.10 points increase in Intergroup Cohesion is associated with a 
0.95 point decline in democracy, which is almost five percent on the democracy scale. For 
ODA we see a positive relationship, which is statistically significant. For an increase in ODA 
by ten percent, democracy rises by 5.6 points. The effect of Rule of Law is again positive and 
statistically significant. A one point increase in Rule of Law (a fifth on the 5-point scale) 
results in a 3.6 points increase in democracy, which is more than half of a standard 
deviation on the democracy scale. The effect of initial GDP is negative, statistically 
significant and quite big. When initial GDP would have been ten percent higher, democracy 
would have been 12.0 points lower, which is almost twice the standard deviation of 
democracy. For a 10 points increase in the initial primary enrolment rate, democracy 
improves only by 0.4 points. Again, the regional dummies show negative and statistically 
significant effects for Africa (-7.6) and Asia (-9.6) on democracy.
The third democracy model shows no statistically significant effect of Clubs and Associations 
on democracy while also development aid and initial level of GDP have no significant 
impact. Rule of Law shows a positive and statistically significant effect. For a one point 
increase on the Rule of Law scale, democracy improves by 1.7 points. Initial education has a 
statistically significant positive effect. A ten percent higher level of initial primary school 
enrolment would have resulted in a 0.3 points higher level of democracy, which is a small 
effect. As in the other two democracy models, the regional dummies point out lower levels 
of democracy in Africa (-6.0) and Asia (-6.8). 
The conclusion from the democracy models, is that the only statistically significant effect of 
civil society on democracy is negative. Initial levels of GDP per capita have no statistically 
significant effect in two of the three models. Rule of Law clearly matters, in a positive way, 
just like initial levels of primary schooling. The effect of ODA is positive and statistically 
significant in two of the three models and of moderate size. The regional effects are very 
similar in all three models and show substantial negative effects for Africa and Asia on the 
level of democracy. This implies that for these two regions, extra policy efforts are needed in 
order to generate substantial improvements in the quality of democracy.
The final set of models is for an alternative measure for democracy namely, human rights. 
This is measured by the Physical Integrity Rights Index, on an 8 points scale. The first model 
shows a negative but no statistically significant effect of Civic Activism on human rights. 
This is a somewhat surprising result. The effect of ODA is significant, negative, and quite 
substantial. It indicates that a ten percent increase in ODA is associated with a decline in 
human rights of 1.4, which is 18% on the human rights scale (running between 0 and 8). 
There are no statistically significant effects of initial education and initial GDP. Formal 
institutions, measured as Rule of Law, show a positive and statistically significant effect on 
human rights. A one point increase in Rule of Law (20% of the scale) is associated with 1.6 
point increase in human rights, which is also a 20% increase on the human rights scale. The 
regional dummies only show a statistically significant effect for Asia, which is negative (-1.9).
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The second human rights model shows a positive and statistically significant effect of 
Intergroup Cohesion on human rights. A 0.10 points increase on the scale of Intergroup 
Cohesion is associated with 0.34 points increase in human rights, which is quite moderate. 
There are no statistically significant effects of ODA, initial education and initial GDP. Rule of 
Law does have a statistically significant and positive coefficient. One point increase in Rule 
of Law leads to a 1.3 points increase in human rights, which is a strong effect. The regional 
dummy for Asia is -1.9, as in the previous model.
Table 5 Determinants of Human Rights, random effects
Civic Activism Intergroup 
Cohesion
Clubs and 
Associations
Civic Activism -1.320
(1.636)
Intergroup Cohesion 3.355***
(0.786)
Clubs and Associations -1.761*
(1.030)
ODA (Log) -0.143* -0.0372 -0.288***
(0.076) (0.084) (0.110)
Primary School Enrollment 
(*100) (25 years prior)
0.205 0.343 0.501
(0.306) (0.371) (0.420)
Rule of Law 1.607*** 1.303*** 1.461***
(0.180) (0.210) (0.266)
Initial GDP (30 years prior) -0.209 -0.146 -0.579***
(0.151) (0.159) (0.213)
South America -0.370 -0.54 -0.432
(0.507) (0.486) (0.644)
Africa -0.534 -0.670 -0.928
(0.466) (0.471) (0.679)
Europe -0.506 -0.680 -0.735
(0.663) (0.625) (0.817)
Asia -1.897*** -1.964*** -2.470***
(0.479) (0.471) (0.704)
Oceania 1.199* 0.603
(0.657) (0.924)
Constant 8.440*** 4.630*** 11.940***
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Table 5 Determinants of Human Rights, random effects
Civic Activism Intergroup 
Cohesion
Clubs and 
Associations
(1.374) (1.573) (1.977)
Observations 393 313 204
Number of id 111 98 63
R Squared (within) 0.1159 0.1305 0.0872
R Squared (between) 0.4763 0.4582 0.4739
R Squared (overall) 0.4163 0.4255 0.4287
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The third human rights model shows a small statistically significant effect of Clubs and 
Associations, which, however, is negative. The size is moderate, with a ten percent increase 
in the score for Clubs and Associations implying a decline in human rights by 0.18 points. 
ODA also shows a negative statistically significant effect. A ten percent increase in ODA leads 
to a decline in human rights by 2.9 points, which is more than a standard deviation on the 
human rights scale. There is no statistically significant effect of initial education. Rule of 
Law shows a positive and statistically significant effect on human rights. When Rule of Law 
increases one point, human rights improve by 1.5 points. Initial GDP shows a negative 
effect, which in this model is statistically significant and quite large. This implies that if 
initial GDP per capita would have been ten percent higher, human rights would be 5.8 
points lower. Finally, the regional dummies show a similar result as the two other human 
rights models.
The conclusion of the three human rights models is that civil society has an ambiguous 
effect on human rights. Intergroup Cohesion has a substantial positive effect, whereas 
Clubs and Associations has a negative effect, which is half the size of that of Intergroup 
Cohesion. Civic Activism has no statistically significant effect. Development aid has a 
negative effect on human rights, which is statistically significant in two of the three models. 
Initial GDP is only in one of the models statistically significant and negative, whereas 
education is not significant in either of the three models. Rule of Law, however, appears to 
have a relatively strong positive effect on human rights, in all three models. The regional 
dummies show that only for Asia there is a statistically significant effect, which is negative.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
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6.1  Conclusions
The study has two parts: a literature review and an empirical analysis. The literature review 
has led to several interesting insights about the relationship between civil society and 
development outcomes, which have formed the backbone of our analytical framework. 
First, there are no quantitative studies available, to our knowledge, on the relationships 
between civil society on the one hand and poverty and democracy on the other hand. 
Studies that look at institutions and development are restricted to formal institutions and  
a very narrow social capital variable, while their focus of analysis is limited to GDP. 
Quantitative research on democracy also ignores the role of civil society, except for 
conceptually problematic variables of ethnic or linguistic fractionalization. Second, Social 
Capital has increasingly been recognized as a micro-variable for which the general trust 
question is not adequate. Recently, researchers have identified social cohesion as the more 
appropriate concept for measurement of cohesion of civil society. Third, recent research 
begins to include both formal and informal institutions, hence, both state and civil society 
institutions, in order to capture substitution effects and complementarity effects between 
these two sectors in society. Fourth, civil society is widely recognized as a normative 
concept, implying that a stronger civil society is good for development outcomes, such as 
poverty reduction, democratization, and human rights, except when there are strong 
horizontal inequalities. Fifth, horizontal inequalities matter for both civil society – in the 
social capital literature referred to as bonding social capital (in groups) versus bridging 
social capital (social cohesion) – and for development outcomes. 
The empirical analysis started out with a justification and explanation of the variables used, 
remaining largely in line with the current quantitative and qualitative empirical literature 
about civil society and development. The methodological explanation and justification of our 
estimation method included a set of Granger-inspired causality tests, as a substitute for the 
unavailability of instrumental variables for a two stage least square estimation, also in the 
literature that we reviewed. These suggested that the first set of models, on the effect of ODA 
on civil society, need to be taken with much caution. They do not imply causal relationships.
The main statistically significant and substantially meaningful findings of our model 
estimations are as follows. First, we find two positive and one negative association of ODA 
with civil society. The effects are quite substantial, but should not be taken as causal, as was 
mentioned just above. Rule of Law shows a large positive effect in two of the three civil 
society models. This seems to suggest complementarity between formal institutions and 
informal institutions for Civic Activism and Clubs and Associations and substitution 
between these two types of institutions for Intergroup Cohesion. This finding is in line with 
the principal components analysis and OLS regressions by Williamson (2009: 378). “In some 
countries, they are complementary and at other times they are substitutes.” Hence, we 
conclude from the first set of models that ODA may have a small positive effect on 
strengthening civil society but may at the same time undermine intergroup cohesion. 
Further research is necessary to uncover both the causality of the relationship as well as  
the unexpected negative sign for one of the civil society indices. 
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Second, the poverty models are more robust according to the Granger tests performed. They 
show a moderate positive impact of Civic Activism on poverty reduction but not of the other 
two civil society indices. ODA has a substantial positive effect on poverty reduction in all 
three models. Interestingly, formal institutions, measured by Rule of Law, do not have any 
effect on poverty reduction. Also this finding can be related to Williamson, who concludes 
that countries with weak formal institutions but strong informal institutions, such as the 
Netherlands, perform better economically than those with strong formal institutions and 
weak informal institutions – a category with only developing countries in her analysis, 
which includes for example Pakistan. Third, the democracy models show a modest negative 
impact of one of the civil society indices, namely Intergroup Cohesion. ODA and Rule of Law 
both have positive effects on democracy. Finally, the human rights models show that not 
only Intergroup Cohesion but also Clubs and Associations have a substantial effect on 
human rights. However, the sign for Intergroup Cohesion is positive, whereas the sign for 
Clubs and Associations is negative. This indicates that more cohesion between groups 
promotes humans rights whereas more memberships of organizations reduces human 
rights. This can be explained with the distinction between bonding and bridging capital in 
the social capital literature: people may be member of social-group based organizations 
along ethnic, religious or gender lines, for example, which will undermine social cohesion. 
At the same time, in poor societies, clubs and associations are an important source of 
welfare provisions. So, ODA does seem to have a positive effect on poverty reduction, also 
when controlled for the strength of civil society.
Development aid appears to have a negative effect on human rights. This, however, may be 
the case in which high levels of inequality both explain low protection of human rights and 
high amounts of ODA. So, there may be a selection bias involved with ODA-receiving 
countries. Rule of Law has a positive and quite strong effect on human rights. This suggests, 
as expected, that Rule of Law is a necessary condition for improving human rights in a 
country. It also indicates that formal institutions are complementary to Intergroup 
Cohesion and have a substitution effect with Clubs and Associations. This may explain what 
Davis and Hopkins (2011) have found in their analysis of formal institutions, inequality, and 
growth, namely that the equality of formal institutions matters more than the quality of 
formal institutions. “One of our central contentions has been that low quality institutions 
are inherently associated with unequal economic and political rights” (p. 995). Hence, our 
finding that the Rule of Law has a positive and strong impact on human rights while at the 
same time Clubs and Associations have a negative effect may indicate that the quality of 
formal institutions may be strong, but the institutions are implemented in an unequal 
society, where people organize themselves along social divisions. And as Williamson (2009) 
has argued, this tends to lead to lower development outcomes than when civil society 
institutions are strong (implying low inequality) with weaker formal institutions.
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6.2  Policy Implications
It should be borne in mind that the policy implications may be influenced by possible 
endogeneity effects, which have only been partially addressed in our study. Taking this into 
account, we identify cautiously a couple of possible implications from the statistically 
significant results of our empirical analysis.
Civil society contributes positively to poverty reduction and human rights through Civic 
Activism and Intergroup Cohesion. This implies that development policy targeting poverty 
and human rights could be made more effective by strengthening these two dimensions of 
civil society. This concerns in particular strengthening the free press, which is implied in the 
indicators of Civic Activism, and helping to reduce prejudices and tension between groups 
in society, which is an important aspect of the Intergroup Cohesion index. ODA has a direct 
positive effect on Civic Activism, but a direct negative effect on Intergroup Cohesion. This 
suggests that more of the current type of ODA is likely to increase civic activism but not 
social cohesion. This result supports the need for donors to move towards an inclusive 
growth agenda with an important role for social cohesion, as the recent OECD report 
already recognizes: “A social cohesion agenda seeks to leverage different sector policies so 
that they promote social inclusion, build trust and civic participation, and foster social 
mobility. Taking these three dimensions as the pillars of a social cohesion agenda goes 
beyond the traditional ‘pro-poor-growth’ approach that has been extensively discussed in 
the last five years” (OECD, 2012: 249).
The negative coefficient for the direct effect of ODA on Intergroup Cohesion suggests that 
the current type of ODA may perhaps not help to improve intergroup cohesion in 
developing countries. This might be because it strengthens some groups and not others, or 
because it reinforces, unwittingly, existing prejudices and tensions between social groups. 
This caution is precisely what we find in the policy recommendations by Robinson and 
Friedman (2005: 43), concluding that donor support should: “ensure that groups in rural or 
urban low-income areas and those with a mass membership also receive adequate support 
… this approach would have the advantage of strengthening organisations that represent 
poorer groups and potentially increase the diversity perspectives under a democratic 
system.” However, they warn that even then, inequality and tensions can still arise: “But this 
does not mean that increased support to grassroots organizations would necessarily 
strengthen democracy, since many are exclusive in their membership (by gender and 
ethnicity), are not transparent in their internal affairs and are not accountable to their 
members” (ibid.)
Furthermore, Intergroup Cohesion has a negative effect on democracy whereas Clubs and 
Associations has a negative effect on human rights. Again these effects may indicate that 
social cohesion and club membership run largely along social divisions in society, 
reinforcing negative attitudes and tensions between social groups. 
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The relatively unambiguous effect of civil society on a development outcome, directly and 
through ODA, is Civic Activism on poverty reduction: ODA seems to strengthen Civic 
Activism, while Civic Activism seems to contribute to poverty reduction. Here the size effects 
become relevant. A ten percent increase in ODA would improve Civic Activism by seven 
percent (Table 2). And a seven points increase in Civic Activism would lead to a reduction in 
poverty by three percent (Table 3). In addition, there appears to be a direct effect of ODA on 
poverty reduction: a ten percent increase in ODA reduces poverty by 12.6 percentage points 
(Table 3). If we would take these two together, ignoring for the moment possible 
endogeneity effects, the direct and indirect effect of a ten percent increase in ODA on 
poverty reduction could be around 15-16 percent. This suggests that ODA might become 
even more poverty reducing when it would actively stimulate Civic Activism, which means 
in particular by supporting free press, in order to enable people’s objective information 
gathering about politics and what is going on in the world through newspapers, radio, tv 
and internet (see the Annex 3 for a full list of the indicators in the Civic Activism Index). 
Access to and use of (independent) news media and participation in demonstrations and 
petitions will support the accountability of government policy and finances, and allows the 
building up of public pressure for a more equal distribution of expenditures and more 
progressive taxation. This helps to reduce relative and absolute levels of poverty. 
Even though in our empirical results Civic Activism has a positive but not statistically 
significant coefficient on democracy and human rights, the literature that we reviewed 
advises the support of Civic Activism also for these development outcomes (Robinson and 
Friedman, 2005; OECD, 2012). They advise this precisely because it would “increase the 
support for strengthening the more qualitative side of democracy: civil society, the free 
press, union movements, and any counterweight to the constitutional power of the state” 
(OECD, 2012: 248). Donors should contribute to “building political efficacy for a wider and 
more representative range of civil society organisations, with positive implications for 
strengthening democracy through autonomous civic action” (Robinson and Friedman, 
2005: 44). 
Rule of Law is the other relevant policy variable in our empirical analysis. We find that it 
tends to improve the democracy scores, even when the civil society indices show no effect 
or a negative effect, as is the case for Intergroup Cohesion. It also appears to improve 
human rights, complementary to the positive effect of Intergroup Cohesion and 
substituting for the negative effect of Clubs and Associations. This suggests that diplomacy 
to improve the Rule of Law in developing countries seems a useful tool to support 
democracy and human rights. But for poverty reduction, this variable does not have any 
effect. This indicates that for development, Rule of Law is probably a necessary condition, 
but not a sufficient one. That is precisely why the latest OECD annual report recommends 
that donors should go beyond “focusing simply on putting in place the right institutional 
mechanisms” (OECD, 2012: 249). Easterly at al. (2006: 117) have made the point even 
stronger by advising that support for civil society should best go “through the 
empowerment of domestic constituencies rather than via ‘conditionalities’ imposed by 
external donors and development agencies.”
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The main, tentative, policy conclusions of our study in relation to our hypothesis are that a 
focus of ODA on Civic Activism might help to strenghten the poverty reducing effect of ODA, 
that diplomacy focusing on strengthening formal institutions could support both 
democracy and human rights (but not poverty reduction), and that any direct or indirect 
ODA to civil society should actively prevent inequalities, prejudices and tensions between 
social groups. With all the caveats in our empirical study, our tentative results support a 
conclusion that it is important to move away from a fragmented support of civil society 
towards a social cohesion agenda for ODA, which involves an integrated approach of 
fostering civic activism and diverse forms of self-organisation while at the same time 
actively helping to reduce inequalities and prejudices between social groups, through 
governments and next to government support.
Annexes
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Annex 1  About IOB
 
Objectives
The remit of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is to increase insight 
into the implementation and effects of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for the 
independent evaluation of policy and operations in all the policy fields of the Homogenous 
Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the planning and 
implementation of evaluations that are the responsibility of policy departments of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
Its evaluations enable the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development 
Cooperation to account to parliament for policy and the allocation of resources. In addition, 
the evaluations aim to derive lessons for the future. To this end, efforts are made to 
incorporate the findings of evaluations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy cycle. 
Evaluation reports are used to provide targeted feedback, with a view to improving the 
formulation and implementation of policy. Insight into the outcomes of implemented 
policies allows policymakers to devise measures that are more effective and focused. 
Organisation and quality assurance
IOB has a staff of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out evaluations 
it calls on assistance from external experts with specialised knowledge of the topic under 
investigation. To monitor the quality of its evaluations IOB sets up a reference group for 
each evaluation, which includes not only external experts but also interested parties from 
within the ministry and other stakeholders. In addition, an Advisory Panel of four 
independent experts provides feedback and advice on the usefulness and use made of 
evaluations. The panel’s reports are made publicly available and also address topics 
requested by the ministry or selected by the panel.
 
Programming of evaluations
IOB consults with the policy departments to draw up a ministry-wide evaluation 
programme. This rolling multi-annual programme is adjusted annually and included in the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the ministry’s budget. IOB bears final responsibility for the 
programming of evaluations in development cooperation and advises on the programming 
of foreign policy evaluations. The themes for evaluation are arrived at in response to 
requests from parliament and from the ministry, or are selected because they are issues of 
societal concern. IOB actively coordinates its evaluation programming with that of other 
donors and development organisations.
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Approach and methodology
Initially IOB’s activities took the form of separate project evaluations for the Minister for 
Development Cooperation. Since 1985, evaluations have become more comprehensive, 
covering sectors, themes and countries. Moreover, since then, IOB’s reports have been 
submitted to parliament, thus entering the public domain. The review of foreign policy and 
a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996 resulted in IOB’s remit being 
extended to cover the entire foreign policy of the Dutch government. In recent years it has 
extended its partnerships with similar departments in other countries, for instance through 
joint evaluations and evaluative activities undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-DAC 
Network on Development Evaluation.
IOB has continuously expanded its methodological repertoire. More emphasis is now given 
to robust impact evaluations implemented through an approach in which both quantitative 
and qualitative methods are applied. IOB also undertakes policy reviews as a type of 
evaluation. Finally, it conducts systematic reviews of available evaluative and research 
material relating to priority policy areas.
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Annex 3  Diagrams
Diagram A1  Countries with highest and lowest changes in Civic Activism 2000-2010
Diagram A2  Countries with highest and lowest changes in Intergroup Cohesion 2000-2010
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Diagram A3  Countries with highest and lowest changes in Clubs and Associations 2000-2010
Diagram A4  Scatter plot for Intergroup Cohesion and log ODA, average for 1995-2010 
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Annexes
Diagram A5  Scatter plot for poverty and Civic Activism, average for 1995-2010 
Diagram A6  Scatter plot for democracy and Intergroup Cohesion, average for 1995-2010 
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Diagram A7.  Scatter plot for human rights and Intergroup Cohesion, average for 1995-2010 
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Table A1 The Indicators of the Civic Activism Index
Indicator Source Countries
% of public who have listened to radio news ‘in 
the last day’ or ‘several times  
in the last week’ Afrobarometer 16
% of public who have watched TV news  
‘in the last day’ or ‘several times in the  
last week’ Afrobarometer 16
% of public who have read newspaper news ‘in 
the last day’ or ‘several times  
in the last week’ Afrobarometer 16
Civicus civil society rating — Structure Civicus 37
Civicus civil society rating — Environment Civicus 37
Civicus civil society rating — Values Civicus 37
Civicus civil society rating — Impact Civicus 37
Radios per capita Intern. Telecom. Union 197
Radios per household Intern. Telecom. Union 197
% of public who ‘have’ or ‘would be prepared’ 
to take part in a peaceful demonstration Latinobarometer 19
% of public who ‘have’ or ‘would be prepared’ 
to sign a petition Latinobarometer 18
Respondent says they use radio to inform 
themselves about politics Latinobarometer 18
% says they use newspaper to inform 
themselves about politics Latinobarometer 18
Respondent says they use TV to inform 
themselves about politics Latinobarometer 18
% of respondents who watch TV news  
a great deal or very much Latinobarometer 18
% of respondents who read newspaper news  
a great deal or very much Latinobarometer 18
% of respondents who listent radio news  
a great deal or very much Latinobarometer 18
Average number of days spent watching  
TV news, per week Latinobarometer 19
Average number of days spent reading 
newspaper news, per week Latinobarometer 19
Average number of days spent listening  
to radio news, per week Latinobarometer 19
Density of secretariats of international  
non-governmental organisations in a country Global Civil Society Project 175
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Table A1 The Indicators of the Civic Activism Index
Indicator Source Countries
Extent to which organisations and individuals 
are members of INGOs, number of INGOs with 
members in that country Global Civil Society Project 176
% of the workforce employed in the NGO sector SAIS 36
Newspapers per capita UNESCO 107
Daily newspaper titles, per capita UNESCO 107
% of respondents who either ‘have done’  
or ‘might’ sign a petition 
World Values Surveys, 
Latinobarometer 89
% of respondents who either ‘have done’  
or ‘might’ join a boycott World Values Surveys 81
% of respondents who ‘have done’ or ‘might’ 
attend a peaceful demonstration 
World Values Surveys, 
Afrobarometer, Latinobarom-
eter 96
% of respondents who have used a daily 
newspaper in the last week to find out what  
is going on in the world World Values Surveys 22
% of respondents who have used news 
broadcasts on radio or TV in the last week  
to find out what is going on in the world World Values Surveys 22
% of respondents who have used printed 
magazines in the last week to find out what  
is going on in the world World Values Surveys 22
% of respondents who have used in depth 
reports on radio or TV in the last week to find 
out what is going on in the world World Values Surveys 22
% of respondents who have used books in  
the last week to find out what is going on in  
the world World Values Surveys 22
% of respondents who have used internet or 
email in the last week to find out what is going 
on in the world World Values Surveys 22
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Evaluation reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) 
published 2008-2012
Evaluation reports published before 2008 can be found on the IOB website: www.minbuza.nl/iob
IOB no. Year Title evaluation report ISBN
367 2012 Energievoorzieningszekerheid en Buitenlandbeleid 
– Beleidsdoorlichting 2006-2010
979-90-5328-424-7
366 2012 Drinking water and Sanitation – Policy review of the 
Dutch Development Cooperation 1990-2011
978-90-5328-423-0
366 2012 Drinkwater en sanitaire voorzieningen – Beleids-
doorlichting van het OS-beleid 1990-2011
978-90-5328-422-3
365 2012 Tactische diplomatie voor een Strategisch Concept 
– De Nederlandse inzet voor het NAVO Strategisch 
Concept 2010
978-90-5328-421-6
364 2012 Effectiviteit van Economische Diplomatie: 
Methoden en Resultaten van Onderzoek.
978-90-5328-420-9 
363 2011 Improving food security: A systematic review of the 
impact of interventions in agricultural production, 
value chains, market regulation, and land security 
978-90-5328-419-3
362 2011 De Methodische kwaliteit van Programma-evaluaties 
in het Medefinancieringsstelsel-I 2007-2010
978-90-5328-418-6
361 2011 Evaluatie van de Twinningfaciliteit Suriname- 
Nederland
978-90-5328-417-9
360 2011 More than Water: Impact evaluation of drinking 
water supply and sanitation interventions in rural 
Mozambique
978-90-5328-414-8
359 2011 Regionaal en geïntegreerd beleid? Evaluatie van het 
Nederlandse beleid met betrekking tot de 
Westelijke Balkan 2004-2008
978-90-5328-416-2
358 2011 Assisting Earthquake victims: Evaluation of Dutch 
Cooperating aid agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 
2010
978-90-5328-413-1
357 2011 Le risque d’effets éphémères: Evaluation d’impact 
des programmes d’approvisionnement en eau 
potable et d’assainissement au Bénin
978-90-5328-415-5
357 2011 The risk of vanishing effects: Impact Evaluation of 
drinking water supply and sanitation programmes 
in rural Benin
978-90-5328-412-4
356 2011 Between High Expectations and Reality: An 
evaluation  of budget support in Zambia 
978-90-5328-411-7
355 2011 Lessons Learnt: Synthesis of literature on the impact 
and effectiveness of investments in education
978-90-5328-410-0
354 2011 Leren van NGOs: Studie van de basic education 
interventies van geselecteerde Nederlandse NGOs
978-90-5328-409-4
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353 2011 Education matters: Policy review of the Dutch 
contribution to basic education 1999–2009
978-90-5328-408-7
352 2011 Unfinished business: making a difference in basic 
education. An evaluation of the impact of education 
policies in Zambia and the role of budget support.
978-90-5328-407-0
351 2011 Confianza sin confines: Contribución holandesa a la 
educación básica en Bolivia (2000-2009)
978-90-5328-406-3
350 2011 Unconditional Trust: Dutch support to basic 
education in Bolivia (2000-2009)
978-90-5328-405-6
349 2011 The two-pronged approach Evaluation of 
Netherlands Support to Formal and Non-formal 
Primary Education in Bangladesh, 1999-2009
978-90-5328-404-9
348 2011 Schoon schip. En dan? Evaluatie van de schuldver-
lichting aan de Democratische Republiek Congo 
2003-2010 (Verkorte samenvatting)
978-90-5328-403-2
347 2011 Table rase  et après? Evaluation de lAllègement de 
la Dette en République Démocratique du Congo 
2003-2010
978-90-5328-402-5
346 2011 Vijf Jaar Top van Warschau De Nederlandse inzet 
voor versterking van de Raad van Europa
978-90-5328-401-8
345 2011 Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen 
Evaluatie van de Schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst 
van 2005 tussen de Club van Parijs en Nigeria. 
(Verkorte Versie)
978-90-5328-398-1
344 2011 Intérêts communs - avantages communs Evaluation 
de l’accord de 2005 relatif à l’allègement de la dette 
entre le Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Version Abrégée)
978-90-5328-399-8
343 2011 Wederzijdse belangen – wederzijdse voordelen 
Evaluatie van de schuldverlichtingsovereenkomst 
van 2005 tussen de Club van Parijs en Nigeria. 
(Samenvatting)
978-90-5328-397-4
342 2011 Intérêts communs - avantages communs Evaluation 
de l’ccord de 2005 relatif à l’allègement de la dette 
entre le Club de Paris et le Nigéria. (Sommaire)
978-90-5328-395-0
341 2011 Mutual Interests – mutual benefits Evaluation of the 
2005 debt relief agreement between the Paris Club 
and Nigeria. (Summary report)
978-90-5328-394-3
340 2011 Mutual Interests – mutual benefits Evaluation of the 
2005 debt relief agreement between the Paris Club 
and Nigeria. (Main report)
978-90-5328-393-6
338 2011 Consulaire Dienstverlening Doorgelicht 2007-2010 978-90-5328-400-1
337 2011 Evaluación de las actividades de las organizaciones 
holandesas de cofinanciamiento activas en 
Nicaragua
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336 2011 Facilitating Resourcefulness. Synthesis report of the 
Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Develop-
ment.
978-90-5328-392-9
335 2011 Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Develop-
ment. The case of the Netherlands Commission for 
Environmental Assessment (NCEA)
978-90-5328-391-2
2011 Aiding the Peace. A Multi-Donor Evaluation of 
Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding 
Activities in Southern Sudan 2005 - 2010
978-90-5328-389-9
333 2011 Evaluación de la cooperación holandesa con 
Nicaragua 2005-2008
978-90-5328-390-5
332 2011 Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Develop-
ment. The case of  PSO 
978-90-5328-388-2
331 2011 Evaluation of Dutch support to Capacity Develop-
ment. The case of the Netherlands Institute for 
Multiparty Democracy (NIMD)
978-90-5328-387-5
330 2010 Evaluatie van de activiteiten van de medefinancie-
ringsorganisaties in Nicaragua 
978-90-5328-386-8
329 2010 Evaluation of General Budget Support to Nicaragua 
2005-2008
978-90-5328-385-1
328 2010 Evaluatie van de Nederlandse hulp aan Nicaragua 
2005-2008
978-90-5328-384-4
327 2010 Impact Evaluation. Drinking water supply and 
sanitation programme supported by the Nether-
lands in Fayoum Governorate, Arab Republic of 
Egypt, 1990-2009
978-90-5328-381-3
326 2009 Evaluatie van de Atlantische Commissie (2006-
2009)
978-90-5328-380-6
325 2009 Beleidsdoorlichting van het Nederlandse export-
controle- en wapenexportbeleid
978-90-5328-379-0
- 2009 Evaluation policy and guidelines for evaluations No ISBN
324 2009 Investing in Infrastructure 978-90-5328-378-3
- 2009 Synthesis of impact evaluations in sexual and 
reproductive health and rights
978-90-5328-376-9
323 2009 Preparing the ground for a safer World 978-90-5328-377-6
322 2009 Draagvlakonderzoek. Evalueerbaarheid en 
resultaten
978-90-5328-375-2
321 2009 Maatgesneden Monitoring ‘Het verhaal achter de 
cijfers’
978-90-5328-374-5
320 2008 Het tropisch regenwoud in het OS-beleid 1999-
2005
978-90-5328-373-8
319 2008 Meer dan een dak. Evaluatie van het Nederlands 
beleid voor stedelijke armoedebestrijding
978-90-5328-365-3
318 2008 Samenwerking met Clingendael 978-90-5328-367-7
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317 2008 Sectorsteun in milieu en water 978-90-5328-369-1
316 2008 Be our guests (sommaire) 978-90-5328-372-1
316 2008 Be our guests (summary) 978-90-5328-371-4
316 2008 Be our guests (Main report English) 978-90-5328-371-4
316 2008 Be our guests (samenvatting) 978-90-5328-370-7
316 2008 Be our guests (hoofdrapport) 978-90-5328-370-7
315 2008 Support to Rural Water Supply and Sanitation in 
Dhamar and Hodeidah Governorates, Republic of 
Yemen
978-90-5328-368-4
314 2008 Primus Inter Pares; een evaluatie van het Neder-
landse EU-voorzitterschap 2004
978-90-5328-364-6
313 2008 Explore-programma 978-90-5328-362-2
312 2008 Impact Evaluation: Primary Education Zambia 978-90-5328-360-8
311 2008 Impact Evaluation: Primary Education Uganda 978-90-5328-361-5
310 2008 Clean and Sustainable? 978-90-5328-356-1
309 2008 Het vakbondsmedefinancieringsprogramma – Sum-
mary English
978-90-5328-357-8
309 2008 Het vakbondsmedefinancieringsprogramma  
Resumen Español
978-90-5328-357-8
309 2008 Het vakbondsmedefinancieringsprogramma 978-90-5328-357-8
308 2008 Het Nederlandse Afrikabeleid 1998-2006. Evaluatie 
van de bilaterale samenwerking
978-90-5328-359-2
308 2008 Het Nederlandse Afrikabeleid 1998-2006. Evaluatie 
van de bilaterale samenwerking (Samenvatting)
978-90-5328-359-2
307 2008 Beleidsdoorlichting seksuele en reproductieve 
gezondheid en rechten en hiv/aids 2004-2006
978-90-5328-358-5
If you want to receive a publication in printed form, please send an e-mail to  
IOB@minbuza.nl, mentioning the title and ISBN-number.
The publications can be downloaded at our IOB-website: http://www.minbuza.nl/iob
Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
070-348 6498
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In addition to bilateral and multilateral 
programs, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) play an important role in channeling 
development aid towards their Southern 
partners. Rigorous evaluations of programs and 
projects are scarce and tend to be limited to the 
analysis of perceived effects at local level. Far 
less attention is usually devoted to the aggre-
gate effect of development aid on global civil 
society strength and performance. This is, 
however, considered of utmost importance 
given the overarching aim of strengthening the 
role of civil society in the development process. 
The recently developed database Indices of 
Social Development (ISD) hosted by the 
Institute of Social Studies (ISS) of the Erasmus 
university Rotterdam offers a unique opportu-
nity to further analyze the relationships 
between civil society development and 
development aid (ODA) over a period of 20 
years, making use of cross-country data of 
multidimensional indicators related to civic 
activism, intergroup cohesion and club mem-
bership. The main findings of the study suggest 
that aid exhibits an ambivalent relation with 
civil society development. This study was 
carried out by Prof. dr. Irene van Staveren and 
Ellen Webbink of the International Institute for 
Social Studies, Erasmus university Rotterdam, 
and commissioned by the Policy and Operations 
Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
